



The close of the 1982-83 academic year marked the end of an impor-
tant chapter in the life of the Yale Law School-the thirty-seven years in
which Ralph S. Brown and Boris I. Bittker were active members of the
faculty. At the dinner on April 15, 1983, at which the School paid tribute
to these two extraordinary scholars and teachers, Elias Clark and I-who
had been students when Professors Bittker and Brown joined the faculty
in 1946-were privileged to speak about our mentor-friends. Eli talked
about Boris; Eli's very moving tribute was reprinted in a recent issue of
the Journal.1 I am grateful to the Journal for inviting me to write a few
paragraphs about Ralph; what follows draws upon, but does not dupli-
cate, what I said last April.
Ralph Brown is an exemplary teacher. Steadily broadening his profes-
sional horizons, he has taught his way across a curriculum which he him-
self has done much to enlarge.2 But whatever the course or seminar Ralph
offers, the same enthusiasm for the teaching process suffuses the class-
room. Ralph's students quickly discover that they and their instructor are
engaged in a joint enterprise in which the stakes are high (in a vital aca-
demic colloquy, there are no simple questions or easy answers) and the
responsibilities higher still. Words, as the medium of intellectual ex-
change, are sacred; so too is rationality, the lubricant of that exchange.
The instructor is the senior partner in a professional undertaking of great
moment, for the client is truth.'
Ralph Brown is an exemplary scholar. Painstaking research, surgically
t United States District Judge, Eastern District of Pennsylvania; member of the Yale Law School
Faculty, 1955-74; Dean, 1965-70.
1. Clark, Boris I. Bitiker: Colleague and Friend, 93 YALE L.J. 199 (1983).
2. According to my assuredly incomplete recollection, Ralph has over the years offered one or
more courses in each of the following fields: antitrust, conflicts, copyright, corporations, education law,
environmental law, regulated industries, and torts. Boris Bittker is similarly eclectic and omnicom-
petent. The Brown-Bittker pattern of teaching everything in sight is to be contrasted with the prac-
tice-which I think characterizes most of us who have been teachers of law-of tending to limit one's
classroom offerings to two or three fields in which, by the close of the apprentice years, one feels both
interested and comfortable.
3. I did not have the good fortune of taking a class with Ralph. What appears in the text is a
distillation of scores of conversations I have had with Ralph's students. And it accords precisely with




precise analysis, and absolute integrity in putting the pieces to-
gether-these are the hallmarks of Ralph's writings. They are the quali-
ties that have given enduring authority to the definitive work, Loyalty and
Security,4 which, in the late 1950's, in the waning light of the McCarthy
era, probed the most searching First Amendment and procedural due pro-
cess issues of our time. The same qualities have informed all of Ralph's
later works, including his formidable contribution to the law of
copyright.
5
Ralph Brown is an exemplary citizen. He tackles the jobs that need
doing, not because they are fun-though he has a knack for making them
fun-but because they have to be performed. There is an intrinsic unity
about the principal administrative responsibilities he has taken on at Yale:
As periodic interim director of the Law Library, as Associate Dean of the
Law School,6 and as presiding officer of the Yale University Press, Ralph
has always been concerned, philosophically and pragmatically, with seeing
to it that worthwhile books and worthwhile learning are effectively availa-
ble. Ralph's Yale citizenship also connects directly with the endeavors to
which he has long devoted himself on the national scene. He has been a
leading member of the Board of the American Civil Liberties Union al-
most forever: The memory of person runneth not to the contrary. And his
services to the American Association of University Professors, of which he
has been President, likewise trace to a remote past and continue to this
very day: As these paragraphs go to press, Ralph is actively engaged as
General Counsel of the A.A.U.P.
In all his activities, the integrity of the mind and of the legal processes
and institutions that protect the mind have been uppermost. The best evi-
dence of this is to be found in what Ralph himself has written. The elo-
quent closing paragraphs of Loyalty and Security remind us how much
was at hazard a generation ago-and how vulnerable, even today, are the
ramparts we watch:
The lawyer inclines to put his trust in the courts and the Consti-
tution. But we should not expect the courts to carry the whole bur-
den, and in the last decade, lacking leadership from the Supreme
Court, the courts have done very little. Even in demanding the ele-
ments of procedural due process, an issue on which the judges should
4. R. BROWN, LOYALTY AND SECURrrY: EMPLoYMENT TEsTs IN THE UNrrED STATES (1958).
5. These qualities also characterize the writings of Professor/Justice Benjamin Kaplan, co-author
of the Kaplan-Brown copyright casebook.
6. At Boris' suggestion, and with a strong assist from President Kingman Brewster, I persuaded
Ralph to serve as Associate Dean in 1965-70. Looking back on Ralph's magnificent, unsung efforts
during those years of travail, Boris and Kingman would, I am certain, agree with me that inducing
Ralph to assume that thankless deanship was one of the best things anyone has done for the Yale Law
School.
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be most decisive, their role has been timorous. This is deplorable;
but it is not surprising, when the executive, the legislature, and the
people have all been hell-bent for repression. Now, as we learn to
live with the cold war, there has been some reduction of internal
tension, and the judiciary will perhaps take a modest lead. Its capac-
ity for reform is, however, limited. There are few constitutional im-
peratives in the field of employment tests, and the evolution of new
imperatives is a cautious process; witness the [lengthy] gestation of
the principle that racial segregation in public education cannot law-
fully exist. Whether our guidance is to come from the spirit or the
letter of the Constitution, the other branches of government have a
responsibility equal to the courts'. If statutes and executive orders
were properly conceived and executed, the courts would have little to
do.
The ultimate responsibility patently lies on all of us. First and last
this is a problem of democratic self-restraint. I assume that our dem-
ocratic theory does not rest on the naked power of majorities.
Through the Constitution, the majorities of any given moment have
undertaken to withhold some of their power to repress minorities.
But when unstable world politics threaten the survival of a life of
abundance and promise, we throw off self-restraint. Those who are
not for us are against us. Radicals, once tolerated, become disloyal
subversives. The ancient weapons of repression are unsheathed. The
Bill of Rights, we are told, would probably fail of re-enactment to-
day. No single manifestation of this spirit, whether employment
tests, or prosecutions for sedition, or banishment, is likely to be
checked in its course until responsible opinion calls a halt all along
the line.
It would, however, be naive to suppose that "all of us," even
though we are responsible as citizens, are going to experience a
spontaneous impulse to reform. Many are, and always will be, indif-
ferent to these problems. Others consciously or unconsciously reject
toleration. Confident of their own absolutes, they find virtue in im-
posing conformity. There remain the large numbers who, though
they have a strong concern for individual freedom and dignity, have
been overawed. Chilled by the insecurity of the atomic age, they have
not questioned the demands that have been made in the name of
security. Valuing loyalty, they have not challenged specious defini-
tions of disloyalty. Detesting communism, they have swallowed the
excesses of anticommunism. On these people I urge the two domi-
nant conclusions of this book. First, that loyalty and security tests
have been practiced with too much rigor and too little humanity.
Second, that these tests needlessly impair the great freedoms of be-
lief, of speech, and of association enshrined in the First
Amendment."
7. R. BROWN, supra note 4, at 484-85 (footnotes omitted). I suppose it is arguable that the Law
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Ralph Brown
Last year Ralph Brown delivered the annual Finxeistein Lecture on
Copyright at Cardozo Law School. He entitled the lecture "The Widen-
ing Gyre," drawing on Yeat's "The Second Coming" to make the point
that certain aspects of copyright law are losing coherence. One senses,
however, that the lines which, at the beginning and end of this lecture,
Ralph quoted from the great poem have a wider reference than the extent
to which copyright should protect derivative works. One senses Ralph's
enduring concern with threats to the central constitutional order:
Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.8
But Ralph is not an Irish pessimist. Moreover, when the falcon is in
trouble, Ralph doesn't write a poem. He writes an essay or a book, or
gives a lecture, or wheels the A.A.U.P. and/or the ACLU into action.
With Ralph in charge, the center holds.
Journal and I, in publishing so lengthy an excerpt, are infringing the copyright of Professor Brown
and/or Yale University Press. In the past, I have found it prudent to consult Professor Brown before
lifting extravagant amounts of the writings of others. In this instance, I felt that I was compelled to
rely on my own lawyering. I intend, therefore, respectfully to submit, to whatever gimiet-eyed tribu-
nal may become seized of the matter, that due consideration of "the purpose and character of the use,"
17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1982), "the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole," 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1982), and most particularly, "the effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work," 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1982),
should lead to the conclusion that this is "fair use."
8. W. YEATs, The Second Coming, in THE CoLLEcErDa POEMS OF W.B. YEATs 184-85 (1956).
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Books
CASES ON COPYRIGHT, UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND OTHER TOPICS BEARING ON THE PROTECTION
OF LITERARY, MUSICAL, AND ARTISTIC WORKS (3d ed. 1978) (with B. KAPLAN).
CASES ON COPYRIGHT, UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND OTHER ToPICS BEARING ON THE PROTECTION
OF LITERARY, MUSICAL, AND ARTISTIC WORKS (2d ed. 1974) (with B. KAPLAN).
CASES ON COPYRIGHT, UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND OTHER TOPIcs BEARING ON THE PROTECTION
OF LITERARY, MUSICAL, AND ARTISTIC WORKS (1960) (with B. KAPLAN).
LOYALTY AND SECURITY: EMPLOYMENT TESTS IN THE UNITED STATES (1958).
DOMESTIC CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY (Social Science Research Council Pamphlet No. 8, 1951)
(with R. DAHL).
Articles
The Widening Gyre: Are Derivative Works Getting Out of Hand?, CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
(1984) (forthcoming).
The Joys of Copyright, YALE L. REP., Fall/Winter 1982-3, at 20, reprinted in 30 J. COPYRIGHT
Soc'Y U.S.A. 477 (1983).
The Unification of AAUP Policy Documents, 59 EDuc. REc. 30 (1978) (with Finkin).
Unification: A Cheerful Requiem for Common Law Copyright, 24 UCLA L. REV. 1070 (1977).
Financial Exigency, 62 AAUP BULL 5 (1976).
Publication and Preemption in Copyright Law: Elegiac Reflections on Goldstein v. California, 22
UCLA L. REV. 1022 (1975).
Property Rights Under the New Technology, in COMPUTERS, COMMUNICATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 190 (M. Greenberger ed. 1971).
Collective Bargaining in Higher Education, 67 MICH. L. REv. 1067 (1969).
Rights and Responsibilities of Faculty, 52 AAUP BULL. 131 (1966).
Product Simulation: A Right or a Wrong?, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1216 (1964).
The Operation of the Damage Provisions of the Copyright Law: An Exploratory Study, in SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY 86TH CONG., 2D SESS. (Comm. Print 1960).
Character and Candor Requirements for FCC Licensees, 22 LAW & CoNTEmp. PRoBS. 644 (1957).
Lawyers and the Fifth Amendment. A Dissent, 40 A.B.A. J. 404 (1954).
Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 480 (1953) (with Fassett).
Security Tests for Maritime Workers: Due Process Under the Port Security Program, 62 YALE L.J.
1163 (1953) (with Fassett).
Techniques for Influencing Private Investment, in INCOME STABILIZATION IN A DEVELOPING
DEMOCRACY 397 (M. Millikan ed. 1953).
Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165 (1948).
Book Reviews
80 HARV. L. REV. 1621 (1967), reviewing B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT
(1967).
15 STAN. L. REV. 406 (1963), reviewing H. PACKER, Ex-COMMUNIST WITNESSES: FOUR STUDIES
IN FACT FINDING (1962).
72 YALE L.J. 625 (1963), reviewing C. FULDA, COMPETITION IN THE REGULATED INDUSTRIES:
TRANSPORTATION (1961).
65 YALE L.J. 578 (1956), reviewing R. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES (1955); R. MACIVER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN
OUR TIME (1955).
54 COLUM. L. REv. 144 (1954), reviewing E. BoNTECOU, THE FEDERAL LOYALTY-SECURrrY PRO-
GRAM (1953).
57 YALE L.J. 894 (1948) reviewing THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND
RESPONSIBLE PRESS (1947).
56 YALE L.J. 180 (1946), reviewing H. HAZLITI, ECONOMICS IN ONE LESSON (1946); P. DRUCKER,
CONCEPT OF THE CORPORATION (1946).
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